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NOTES AND COMMENT
data necessary to prove the value of his inventions or even that it
has been used. The Government is permitted to withhold 'evi-
dence detrimental to national security. 0 Some suggestions to remedy
this problem have been made; for example, an in camera type of pro-
ceeding."'
The problem of evaluating the invention is an equally difficult
one. While the question "how much is an atomic bomb worth?" is
hardly indicative of the problem to be faced, the complexities of fixing
a price are certain to be great. The entire industry is so new, its
methods and equipment so different,5 2 that a standard for reasonable
payment will be difficult to establish. There is no, basis for com-
parison. Perhaps cost accounting procedures will be of some assist-
ance in weighing improvement inventions. The wisdom of a Solomon
will be needed in evaluating basic inventions.
Conclusion
This summary is far from being a complete catalog of the prob-
lems of the inventor in the field of atomic energy. The Atomic
Energy Act has, if nothing else, increased the complexity of the
already intricate patent law. Perhaps the Act serves best as an
illustration of a law of physics, that, to every action, there is an oppo-
site reaction. Technology has spawned the atomic industry, and in
return, technology has had its own traditions imposed upon.
THE RIGHT OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE TO ATTACK AN ILLUSORY
TRANSFER - TOTTEN TRUSTS
When the common law rights of dower and curtesy were
abolished in New York State,' Section 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law was enacted with the intent and purpose of increasing the in-
terest of a surviving spouse in the property of the deceased. In the
place of these former rights, the survivor was given a personal right
of election to take his or her share as in intestacy against, or in the
absence of, a provision in the testator's will. This section, amount-
ing, in effect, to a statutory limitation on the power of an owner of
50 Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 58 F. Supp. 653 (1937) ; 62 STAT.
977, 28 U. S. C. 2507 (1948).
51 Boskey, supra note 28, at 445-6.
52 For an illustration of the complicating factors, see the Commission's
Eighth Semi-Annual Report, pp. 3-161 (1950).
iN. Y. REAL PRoPPRTY LAW §§ 189, 190.
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real or personal property to direct the mode of distribution of his
net estate subsequent to his death, invalidates, as to the surviving
spouse upon his or her election, a will which fails to make the speci-
fied minimum provision for his or her benefit. 2
The Decedent Estate Law applies only to property owned by the
decedent at the time of his death. If the decedent during his lifetime
sold, made a gift of, or destroyed, in whole or in part, any of his
property, it cannot be a part of his estate and hence is without the
scope of the statute. Section 83 determines those who share in in-
testacy and decrees the amount of each distributee's share. If a will
effectively disposes of all of the testator's property, none but the
named beneficiaries have an interest in the estate. To this there is
one exception. A testator may disinherit any of his relatives, save
his surviving spouse, since Section 18 gives the latter a right to take
an intestate share against or in the absence of a testamentary provi-
sion.
It has always been an accepted principle of law that legatees had
no expectant interest in personal property owned by the decedent
during his lifetime but disposed of by him prior to his death. As far
as real property was concerned, prior to 1930 in New York there
existed the archaic rights of dower and curtesy. Because of the con-
fusion created by these rights and because of the clouds which they
cast upon many titles, it was deemed advisable to abolish them.
Thus, freer alienation of real property was promoted and titles were
rendered more marketable. To compensate for the interest that a
spouse would lose as a result of this change in the law, a new right
was created by Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law.3  Specifically,
this new section gave a surviving spouse an absolute right of election
to take a portion of the deceased spouse's estate in both realty and
personalty. Of course, the electing spouse must establish that the
property in question is actually a part of the estate. Consequently,
one of the problems that arises is that of determining what part of
the estate was absolutely disposed of during the decedent's lifetime.
In the ordinary case, there is no difficulty because the decedent, while
alive, either has or has not completely divested himself of the title
as well as the beneficial incidents of ownership. In either case there
is no difficulty in determining the assets of the estate. But in the
instance where the decedent during his lifetime transfers a part of
his interest in property, while retaining some beneficial right, the
problem becomes acute. In the case of Newman v. Dore,4 the dece-
dent left a will containing a provision for a trust for his wife equal
to her intestate share in his real and personal property. After the
execution of the will, he executed trust agreements by which, in
form, he transferred to trustees all his real and personal property.
2 Matter of Lavine, 167 Misc. 879, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
3 See Report of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of
Estates 12, 13.
4275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. 2d 966 (1937).
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He reserved to himself the enjoyment of the entire income for life
and a right to revoke the trust at will. In general, the powers granted
the trustees were made "subject to the settlor's control during his
life," and could be exercised "in such manner only as the settlor shall
from time to time direct in writing." ' The court, looking at sub-
stance rather than form, held the trusts to be illusory transfers in-
tended only to conceal the effective retention by the settlor of the
property which in form he had conveyed. That is sufficient to render
it an unlawful invasion of the expectant interest of the wife created
by Section 18. Whether a transfer is susceptible to attack by a sur-
viving spouse depends upon the following test laid down by the court
in the Newman case: Has the decedent in good faith divested himself
of ownership of his property? If this question is answered in the
negative, the transfer will be declared illusory. Would there be bad
faith if the donor's motive in transferring his property was to die
penniless and consequently leave no estate to support the surviving
spouse? Apparently not; for the good faith required by the statute
merely requires that the decedent absolutely divest himself of the in-
cidents of ownership by some form of inter vivos conveyance. 6 Where
there is a trust created in which the settlor reserved rights so exten-
sive that the alleged trustee is merely an agent of the settlor and, in
legal effect, merely a custodian without discretion and without au-
thority, the transfer will be held illusory and the surviving spouse
will be given the option to attack it.7 The rule in the Newman case
has not been confined to trusts but has been applied to any illusory
transfer made during decedent's lifetime.
A question has been raised as to the right of the surviving spouse
to attack a "totten trust" 8 on the ground that it is an illusory transfer.
When a depositor puts money in a savings bank 9 in the form of a
trust account, e.g., "A in trust for B," 10 whether a "totten trust" has
been created is largely an evidentiary problem. Vann, J., speaking
for the Court of Appeals in 1904, stated the following rules to be
applied to such an account: "A deposit by one person of his own
money, in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does
not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor.
It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or.
1 Id. at 377, 9 N. E. 2d at 968.
6 Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd,
274 App. Div. 1036, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 917 (1st Dep't 1949).
7 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290,
14 N. Y. S. 2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1940), nodified, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N. Y. S.
2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).8 Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
9 The rules above stated have never been applied to commercial bank
accounts.
10 For a thorough and analytical discussion of the history and interpreta-
tion of rules relating to savings bank trusts, see Matter of Vaughan, 145 Misc.
332, 260 N. Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
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declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the ben-
eficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without
revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the
presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the bal-
ance on hand at the death of the depositor." I" In a "totten trust"
all the earmarks of a valid trust will be found with the possible ex-
ception of the necessary element of intent. Intent is difficult to
ascertain since this form of account is frequently used with a motive
far removed from that of creating a trust. 12 A "totten trust" will be
inferred only when no contrary intent is shown. Of course, in a case
where there is evidence of a real intent to create an actual trust the
courts will give effect to the trust by protecting the beneficiaries'
interests.13 Such intent might be shown by a delivery of the pass
book to the beneficiary. 14
With these basic concepts regarding "totten trusts" in mind, the
question presents itself as to whether they are illusory. Prior to the
enactment of Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law, it was settled
that a "totten trust" was not a part of the decedent's estate; 15 there-
fore, it was not subject to statutes affecting distribution of property
on death, and only the beneficiary was permitted to claim the pro-
ceeds. The beneficiary's claim could only be attacked on the ground
that a valid "totten trust" had not been created and evidence would
have to be adduced to show that the decedent-depositor's intent was
other than that of a donor of a gift to the beneficiary. 16 After the
enactment of Section 18 a question arose as to the right of a surviv-
ing spouse to assail a validly established "totten trust" for being
illusory in that it is revocable during the depositor's lifetime, during
which time he may treat the funds as his own. In the case of
Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank,17 in which the deceased died in-
testate, the Appellate Division, First Department, gave a negative
answer to the question, holding: (1) that since the widow based her
claim on Section 18 exclusively, she must fail because the decedent
left no will. To rely exclusively on Section 18 there must be a will.
(2) To permit the widow to have the trust declared invalid would
11 Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 129, 71 N. E. 748, 758 (1904). The
common law rule above enunciated has been codified to the extent that a bank
is given a statutory defense if it makes payments to the beneficiary. N. Y.
BANxING LAW § 239, subd. 2.12 Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940 (1889). Some examples
of contrary motives are: to avoid taxation; or because the rules of the bank
limit the amount which any one individual may deposit; or because of a desire
to obtain high rates of interest where there is a discrimination based on the
amount of deposits; or because of the desire to conceal one's wealth.
13 Thomas v. Brevoort Savings Bank of B'klyn, 275 App. Div. 724, 87
N. Y. S. 2d 411 (2d Dep't 1949).
14 Matter of Smith, 177 Misc. 601, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 603 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
15 Matter of Rosso, 146 Misc. 746, 262 N. Y. Supp. 861 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
16 See note 12 supra.
7 1258 App. Div. 132, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939), reversing 169
Misc. 1014, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
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allow other intestacy distributees to share in the principal to the ex-
clusion of the beneficiary even though they were not entitled to the
protection of Section 18. Unfortunately, this decision was never
appealed and the question remained open as to whether the widow
would have prevailed had she merely acted to set the trust aside as
illusory and as a fraud upon her rights, rather than basing her claim
wholly on Section 18. The court agreed that, under the decision of
Newman v. Dore,'8 a "totten trust" is an illusory transfer because it
reserves to the depositor all the attributes of ownership during his
lifetime with nothing vesting in the beneficiary until the depositor's
death. At a later date in the case of Krause v. Krause 19 the Court
of Appeals settled the point that where there is a will, a "totten trust"
may be invalidated by the surviving spouse. The holding was to the
effect that such trusts are illusory and within the doctrine of Newman
v. Dore.20 However, the question raised by the Murray case, i.e.,
could they be attacked in the absence of a will, was not answered.
In Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg 21 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, expressly rejected the view taken by the First Depart-
ment that there must be a will in order for the surviving spouse to
attack a transfer as illusory and as a fraud upon her rights under
Section 18. "A widow may have no right to elect pursuant to the
Decedent Estate Law (§ 18) and yet may rely upon it in support of
her action to set aside a revocable trust as illusory where the very
purpose of the decedent in so conveying was to avoid its applica-
tion." 22 This case did not involve a "totten trust." In Burns v.
Turnbull,2= another case not involving a "totten trust," the Appellate
Division, Second Department, again set aside a trust as illusory even
though the decedent died intestate. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision.
24
In Marano v. Lo Carro 2' a transferee contended that plaintiff's
action to set aside a transfer of stock by decedent must fail because
decedent had died intestate. He relied on the Murray case but the
Special Term decided in favor of the plaintiff basing its decision on
the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of Burns v. Turnbull.2 16 This
Special Term decision was upheld on appeal to the Appellate Divi-
18 See note 4 supra.
29 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. 2d 779 (1941), reversing 259 App. Div. 1057, 21
N. Y. S. 2d 341 (4th Dep't 1940), reversing 171 Misc. 355, 13 N. Y. S. 2d
812 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
20 See note 4 supra.
21262 App. Div. 234, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't 1941), affirming 176
Misc. 312, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1941).22 Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 236, 28 N. Y. S. 2d
841, 843 (2d Dep't 1941).
23266 App. Div. 779, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), reversing 37
N. Y. S. 2d 380 (Sup. Ct 1942).
241294 N. Y. 889, 62 N. E. 2d 785 (1945).
25 62 N. Y. S. 2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 999, 63 N. Y. S.
2d 829 (1st Dep't 1946).
26 See note 24 supra.
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sion, First Department. Thus it would seem that the First Depart-
ment now agrees that Burns v. Turnbull overrules its decision in the
Murray case. Although these cases did not involve "totten trusts,"
it takes no great imagination to see that the doctrines there enunciated
would apply with equal force when a "totten trust" is involved. In
Krause v. Krause 27 they were held illusory. Therefore, under
Burns v. Turnbull the surviving spouse has a cause of action to set
them aside even though the decedent died intestate.
The second reason advanced in the Murray case for refusing to
give the surviving spouse a right to attack a "totten trust," that to do
so would allow other relatives (not entitled to statutory protection)
to share in the principal of the trust to the exclusion of the beneficiary,
is readily resolved. Why not permit the surviving spouse to invade
the bank deposit and take whatever share of it he or she may be
entitled to under Section 18? However, the remainder should go to
the beneficiary of the trust rather than become a general asset of the
estate. Succinctly stated, the "totten trust" should be declared illu-
sory and invalid only in so far as the surviving spouse is concerned.
As against all other parties the beneficiary should still retain his
rights. In a recent Special Term decision 28 the beneficiaries were
declared the owners of the bank deposits with the qualification that
the "totten trust" was subject to the right of the surviving spouse
to have the fund treated as part of the estate but only for the purpose
of computing her statutory portion.
At the present time in New York, a surviving spouse may be
disinherited only by means of an inter vivos conveyance in compli-
ance with the Newman v. Dore ruling. Thus, an absolute gift or
trust agreement will effectuate a disinheritance. The efficacious use
of a "totten trust" to accomplish the same result will also depend
upon its "absolute" quality. For example, if the depositor were to
deliver the pass book to the beneficiary, the surviving spouse would
have no grounds for challenging the beneficiary.2 9 Pursuant to
Section 239, subdivision 3 of the New York Banking Law,30 a joint
savings account may be used to achieve the same result. This statute
creates a conclusive presumption that where money has been deposited
in a savings bank 3 1 and a joint tenancy created, e.g., "A or B, pay
27 See note 19 supra.
28 Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949).29 Thomas v. Brevoort Savings Bank of B'klyn, 275 App. Div. 724, 87
N. Y. S. 2d 411 (2d Dep't 1949).
30". ... the deposit in such form [joint tenancy] shall . .. be conclusive
evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either the savings bank or the
surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of both depositors to vest title
to such deposit and the additions thereto in such survivor."
31 Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. 2d 59 (1942), afflrming 263 App.
Div. 925, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), affirming 32 N. Y. S. 2d
1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that the statute has no application to deposits
in form of joint tenancy when left in a commercial bank rather than a savings
bank).
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either or survivor," on the death of one of the named parties all of
the rights of ownership vest in the survivor. By judicial decision,32
it is immaterial that an illusory transfer has taken place as long as
the account has been made in full compliance with the Banking Law.
However, it should be noted that the Law Revision Commission has
recommended the amendment of this statute 3 3 to make the presump-
tion a rebuttable one. Should such an amendment be enacted by the
legislature, this type of savings bank account will in all probability
have the same status as a "totten trust" where the rebuttable pre-
sumption was created by decisional law.3 4 Joint accounts also would
be subjected to the right of a surviving spouse who might complain
of their illusory nature.
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES ARISING FROm BANK-DEPOSITOR
RELATIONSHIP
The relation existing between bank and depositor is generally
said to be that of debtor and creditor.' It is contractual in nature 2
and while the relationship is not that of trustee and cestui que trust,3
greater rights and obligations exist than are found in a mere debtor
and creditor relation.4  The New York Court of Appeals has stated
3 2 Inda v. Inda, spra note 31.
33 1950 LEG. Doc. No. 65(Q), 1950 REPORT, N. Y. LAw REvISI Com-
MISSION.3 4 The presumption, that the depositor intended that the avails of a savings
bank account in trust form should become the property of the beneficiary on
the depositor's death, is not a true presumption of law but is a mere inference
of fact subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence. In re Herle's Estate, 165
Misc. 46, 300 N. Y. Supp. 103 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
I Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E.
371 (1891) ; Bank of British North America v. Merchants' National Bank of
the City of New York, 91 N. Y. 106 (1883).
2 ... the law implies a contract on the part of the defendant to disburse
the money standing to the plaintiffs' credit only upon their order and in con-
formity with their directions." Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York,
126 N. Y. 318, 327, 27 N. E. 371, 372 (1891).
3 The Buchanan Farm Oil Company v. Woodman, 1 Hun 639 (N. Y. 1874).
4 "Ordinarily, the relation between a bank and its depositors is that of
debtor and creditor . . . .However, a bank deposit is more than an ordinary
debt, and the depositor's relation to the bank is not identical with that of an
ordinary creditor." Hubbs, J., in Gibraltar Realty Corporation v. Mount Ver-
non Trust Company, 276 N. Y. 353, 356, 12 N. E. 2d 438, 439 (1938). "The
relation between bank and customer is that of debtor and creditor, with a
superadded obligation on the part of the banker to honour the customer's
cheques if the account is in credit. A cheque drawn by a customer is in point
of law a mandate to the banker to pay the amount according to the tenor of
the cheque." London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777,
789.
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